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THE RETURN OF SPENDING LIMITS:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER
LANDELL V. SORRELL
Richard Briffault*

INTRODUCTION

On August 18, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo,1 does not preclude
mandatory limitations on campaign expenditures. 2 In Landell v.
Sorrell,3 the court concluded that limitations imposed by the state
of Vermont on candidate spending in state election campaigns are
"supported by [the state's] compelling interests in safeguarding
Vermont's democratic process from 1) the corruptive influence of
excessive and unbridled fundraising and 2) the effect that perpetual
fundraising has on the time of candidates and elected officials." 4
To be sure, the court declined to uphold the Vermont limits and,
instead, remanded the case to the district court for a determination
of whether the challenged spending limits are the "least restrictive
means" of "furthering the State's compelling anti-corruption and
time-protection interests."' 5 Nevertheless, Landell is potentially
one of the most important decisions in the evolution of modern
campaign finance law as it marks the first time since Buckley that a
court has held that a candidate expenditure limitation can be
constitutional.
Although path-breaking, Landell is not entirely unprecedented.
In recent years, several communities have sought to challenge
Buckley by adopting spending limits for local6 or state judicial can* Vice-Dean & Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law
School; B.A., Columbia, 1974; J.D., Harvard, 1977.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for reh'g en banc denied,
No. 00-915(L), 2005 WL 826151 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2005). The order denying the rehearing en banc was filed on February 5, 2005, and amended on April 11, 2005, April
20, 2005, and May 11, 2005 to reflect dissenting and concurring opinions. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 97 (internal citation omitted).
5. Id.
6. See Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) (spending limitations on candidates for Cincinnati City Council); Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160
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didates. 7 These restrictions were invalidated on the authority of
Buckley, but a number of the judges who heard the challenges to
these laws displayed some restiveness with Buckley's rejection of
spending limitations." So too, although the Supreme Court has for
nearly three decades continued to adhere to Buckley, aspects of the
Court's recent campaign finance decisions suggest the Court might
be open to rethinking Buckley's premises. 9 Landell could very well
provide the Court with the opportunity to reconsider Buckley.1"
The Landell opinion, while very significant, is also limited in several respects. The Second Circuit's suggestion that voluntary public funding with spending limits may be a less restrictive means of
attaining the goals of spending limits is troubling, and threatens to
pit these two complementary tenets of campaign finance reform
against each other. Moreover, although Landell challenges Buckley's conclusion concerning spending limits, it still works largely
within Buckley's basic conceptual framework. As a result, the Second Circuit's analysis does not reflect the full range of possible justifications for spending limitations.
Part I of this Article will analyze the Landell decision and situate
it in the evolving judicial debate over campaign finance regulation.
Part II will discuss the question, raised by the Second Circuit for
the Landell district court on remand, whether spending limits are
the least restrictive means of attaining the compelling interests relied on by the court. Part III will then examine those interests as
well as other justifications for spending limits. As I will suggest,
the constitutionality of spending limits in principle" would rest on
a stronger foundation if other important interests directly relevant
F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001) (spending limitations on candidates for Albuquerque
city office).
7. See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (spending limits adopted
by the Ohio Supreme Court, as amendments to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct,
for judicial elections).
8. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Homans and Kruse decisions).
9. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
10. Indeed, there is evidence that the Vermont law at issue in Landell was adopted
for that very purpose. See Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *12 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)
("Obviously, the Act was engineered to provide an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to revisit existing law in this area.") (citing a statement by Vermont Secretary of
State Deborah L. Markowitz).
11. I emphasize that my argument supports spending limits in principle, not the
specific spending limits adopted by Vermont. As discussed infra at notes 112 and 114,
those limits are both quite low and apply to a broad range of expenditures. Low
limits can be in tension not only with the free speech values usually asserted in opposition to spending limits but also with the electoral competitiveness argument that
supports spending limits. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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to the financing of democratic elections, particularly electoral competitiveness and voter equality, were taken into account.
I.

LANDELL AND THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF
CANDIDATE EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS

A.

Buckley v. Valeo

Modern campaign finance doctrine begins with the Supreme
Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo that campaign finance regulation directly implicates fundamental First Amendment freedoms of
speech and association.' 2 In so doing, Buckley sharply distinguished between limits on contributions and limits on expenditures. 13 The Court held that expenditures involve direct
communications with the voters, and thus, expenditure ceilings
"impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech. ' 14 As a result, any restriction on expenditures must be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny and narrowly tailored to promote
a compelling state interest.' 5 By contrast, the Court found that a
contribution does not entail an expression of political views; rather,
it "serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and
his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support."16 Although contributions fund the communications of
candidates, "the transformation of contributions into political de7
bate involves speech by someone other than the contributor."
Thus, contribution restrictions do not trigger the same exacting judicial review as spending limits. Moreover, the Court found that
contribution restrictions advance the compelling government inter18
ests of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.
As the Court noted, "[t]o the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined."' 19 Based on the lower speech value of campaign contributions and the compelling interest of preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption, Buckley sustained
12. 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
13. Id. at 20-21.
14. Id. at 39.
15. Id. at 14-20 (holding that restrictions on campaign expenditures are to be
treated as restrictions on "the quantity and diversity of political speech" and, thus,
subject to the "exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment").
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 26-29.
19. Id. at 26.
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the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") limits on donations
by individuals and political committees to federal candidates and
on aggregate annual donations by individuals for federal election
purposes.2 0
In Buckley, however, the Court found that "[n]o governmental
interest that has been suggested is sufficient to justify" FECA's
limitations on expenditures by federal candidates. 2 1 The Court considered three arguments for spending limits: 1) preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption; 2) promoting candidate
equality; and 3) holding down the high and rising costs of campaigns. 22 Although the Court found that the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption were important government
interests, it determined that FECA's contribution limits and disclosure requirements already took care of the corruption problem.
The Court thus concluded that the goals of preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption could not justify the heavy burden on First Amendment rights posed by FECA's expenditure limits. 23 The Court also specifically rejected the argument that
expenditure restrictions are necessary to reduce the incentive to
circumvent contribution limits, finding instead that "[t]here is no
indication that the substantial criminal penalties for violating the
contribution ceilings combined with the political repercussions of
such violations will be insufficient to police the contribution
provisions.24
With respect to candidate equality, the Court found it was not
clear that spending limitations would promote equality. Rather,
such limits could operate "to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start
of the campaign. '25 More generally, the Court found that, with
contribution limitations, different levels of spending by candidates
posed little concern: "[T]he financial resources available to a candidate's campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size and intensity of the candidate's support.
20. Id. at 23-38. Later cases sustained limitations on donations to candidates in
state elections, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), limitations on
donations to political action committees, Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981),
a ban on donations by corporations, FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), and limitations on donations to and by political parties, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003).
21. 424 U.S. at 55.
22. Id. at 45, 53-57.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id. at 56.
25. Id. at 57.
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There is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting
such funds 26to be spent to carry the candidate's message to the
electorate.
As for the third argument for spending limits-holding down
campaign spending levels-the Court held that there was simply no
in limiting the amount of money spent on
governmental interest
27
campaigns.
election
Buckley invalidated not only limitations on candidate spending
but also FECA's limits on so-called independent spending, that is,
expenditures by individuals and groups, acting independently of
any candidate, to support or oppose a candidate. 28 The Court held
that the anti-corruption rationale could not justify these restrictions because "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination
of an expenditure with the candidate ... alleviates the danger that

expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. ' 29 Nor could these limits be justified by
the "governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" since the
the speech of some "to enFirst Amendment precludes restricting
30
others.
of
voice
hance the relative
B.

Recent Judicial Stirrings

Although the contribution/expenditure dichotomy and strict judicial review of spending limits remain fundamental to the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence,31 in recent years
some lower federal courts have expressed discontent with Buckley's apparent constitutional preclusion of spending limits. These
stirrings reflect grass-roots political resistance to Buckley and foreshadowed the Second Circuit's ruling in Landell. The beginnings
of a new judicial debate over spending limits can be seen in33Kruse
v. City of Cincinnati32 and Homans v. City of Albuquerque.
26. Id. at 56.
27. See id. at 57.
28. See id. at 51-54.
29. Id. at 47.
30. Id. at 48-49. Subsequently, the Court invalidated independent expenditure restrictions in the context of a publicly funded presidential election, FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985), and restrictions on the
independent expenditures of political parties, Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
31. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134-35 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000).
32. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998).
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1. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati

In 1995, the Cincinnati City Council adopted an ordinance imposing campaign expenditure limitations on candidates for the
council.34 The action appears to have been motivated in part by a
desire to challenge Buckley. 35 The city contended that the spending limit was justified by Buckley's concern with preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. It presented evidence that
wealthy donors dominated the financing of city elections, and that
the overwhelming majority of local residents believed that large
contributors wielded undue influence over the local political system.36 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that Buckley "foreclose[d] . . . as a matter of law" the use of the anti-corruption

argument to justify a spending limit. 37 The court went on to find
that, as a matter of fact, the city had failed to prove spending limits
were strictly necessary to prevent corruption since the city had not
imposed contribution limits prior to its adoption of spending limits. 38 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that the city had "no evidence
that contribution limits are inadequate to prevent actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption."39
The court also dismissed a new justification for spending limitsreducing the time burden that fundraising poses for officeholders
and candidates. Kruse found this was no more than a restatement
of the argument, rejected in Buckley, that there is a compelling
public interest in reducing campaign costs. 4° Finally, the court determined that arguments raised by the city that spending limits are
necessary to enable candidates without access to wealth to participate in the electoral process, and to enable the voters to consider
33. 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D.N.M. 2002), affd, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004) [hereinafter Homans I]; 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M.
2001), rev'd, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Homans I].
34. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1998).
35. See id. at 910 (noting that proponents of the spending limits believed the city
should challenge Buckley).
36. Id. at 911.
37. Id. at 915. The court specifically concluded that Buckley barred the argument
that spending limits were necessary to eliminate the incentive to circumvent contribution limits. Id.
38. Id. at 916.
39. Id. The court concluded that the city could not rely on the federal experience
with contribution limits in national elections to "support its contention that they will
inevitably prove inadequate at the local level." Id. The court ascribed federal election
problems to the "'soft-money' loophole" in federal restrictions on contributions. Id.
40. See id. at 916-17 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976)).
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those candidates, were barred by Buckley's rejection of equality
rationales for expenditure limitations.41
One member of the Kruse panel, however, took issue with the
dismissal of the time-protection argument, and also raised the possibility that spending limitations could be justified by "the interest
in preserving faith in democracy. ' 42 In his concurrence, Judge
Cohn found that officeholder and candidate time-protection and
the prevention of "public cynicism" about democracy attributable
to unlimited spending are important interests that are conceptually
distinct from the concern about campaign costs dismissed in Buckley. 4 3 Although Judge Cohn agreed with the majority that the city
had "failed to develop a compelling factual record" and thus concurred in the result, he sought to leave an opening for future efforts
to limit campaign spending by concluding that "Buckley... is not a
broad pronouncement declaring all campaign expenditure limits
unconstitutional. ' 44 Rather, he suggested that
[i]t may be possible to develop a factual record to establish that
the interest in freeing officeholders from the pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties, or the interest in preserving faith in our democracy, is compelling, and that campaign
expenditure limits are a narrowly tailored means of serving such
an interest.45
2.

Homans v. City of Albuquerque

Three years later, Judge Cohn's suggestion was embraced by
Judge Vazquez of the federal district court in New Mexico in a
challenge to Albuquerque's spending limits for municipal elections. 46 Albuquerque had adopted spending limits in 1974 and,
amazingly enough, despite Buckley those limits remained on the
books and were apparently enforced through 1995. 47 The limits
were temporarily enjoined in 1997, but restored and amended in
1999.48 When a mayoral candidate sought to enjoin their enforcement in the 2001 race, Judge Vazquez denied the plaintiff's request
41. Id. at 917-18.
42. Id. at 919 (Cohn, D.J., concurring).
43. Id. at 919-20.
44. Id. at 920.
45. Id.
46. Homans I, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001), rev'd, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.
2001).
47. See Homans H, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002), aff'd, 366 F.3d 900
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004).
48. Id.
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for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiff had
shown neither a likelihood of success on the merits nor that the
public interest would benefit from an injunction.49
Rather, the court found on the record that for more than two
decades the Albuquerque spending limits had promoted competitive elections, increased citizen confidence in government, led to
increased voter turnout, reduced the role of large donors, created
opportunities for lower-income and lower-middle-income candidates, and generally improved the quality of electoral campaigns
50
without limiting the ability of candidates to campaign effectively.
Based on that record, the court found the city had demonstrated its
spending limits were necessary to promote the compelling governmental interest in "preserving the public faith in democracy, and
reducing the appearance of corruption."5 1 The district court also
concluded, based on the voter turnout data, that circumstances had
changed in the quarter-century since Buckley so that "it is clear
today that the public perception of Albuquerque citizens is that
unlimited spending infects the political process. '52 The court
echoed Judge Cohn's opinion in Kruse in citing the effect of the
fundraising "arms race" in forcing candidates to "spend innumerable hours eliciting contributions rather than performing public duties or ascertaining the interests of those citizens unable to make
large financial contributions."5 3 The financial arms race, in turn,
reinforced the public perception of special interest domination of
elections. 54 By ending the arms race and reducing the role of
money in elections, the Albuquerque spending limit was narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling government interest.55
Less than a week later, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held, that
the interests identified by the district court were "really no different than the interests deemed insufficient to justify expenditure
injunction
limitations in Buckley" and granted a preliminary
56
limits.
Albuquerque
the
of
enforcement
against
Subsequently, the district court conducted a full trial on the merits. The court again found that unlimited campaign spending interfered with competitive elections by giving incumbents an
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Homans I, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74.
See id. at 1268-70.
Id. at 1272.
See id.
Id. at 1273.
See id.
Id.
Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001).
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advantage. The court noted that all the mayors seeking reelection
in Albuquerque since the adoption of spending limits had been defeated, compared with the eighty-eight percent reelection rate of
incumbent mayors in other cities.
The court again found that
turnout in municipal elections had been higher in Albuquerque
under spending limits than in other cities without spending limits,
and that Albuquerque voters considered their spending-limited
elections to be less influenced by special interest money than fed5 8
eral elections, in which spending is not subject to limitation.
Looking at federal election practices, the court found that it is easy
for large donors to circumvent contribution limitations by bundling. 59 Moreover, with unlimited spending, candidates are "under
a great deal of pressure to engage in fundraising activities and to
depend on the goodwill of their donors."6 The court again concluded that the local spending limit did not interfere with effective
campaigning; indeed, five of the eight candidates, including the
winner and the second- and third-place finishers in the non-limited
2001 election, spent less than the enjoined spending limit would
have allowed.6 1 Ultimately, the district court determined, based on
the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Buckley, that it was "constrained to find" that the city's expenditure limits were unconstitutional.6 2 If the court had been free to apply the analysis it had used
in initially denying the preliminary injunction, however, the limits
would have been upheld as:
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interests of deterring
corruption and the appearance of corruption, promoting public
confidence in government, permitting candidates and officeholders to spend less time fundraising and more time performing their duties as representatives and interacting with voters,
increasing voter interest in and connection to the electoral system, and promoting an open and robust public debate by encouraging electoral competition.63
57. Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002), afj'd, 366 F.3d 900
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004).
58. Id. at 1201.
59. See id. at 1202, 1205 n.2. Bundling is a "manipulative contribution device[ ...
which enable[s] special interests to direct large quantities of money by way of individual contributions to particular candidates." Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 100 (2d
Cir. 2004).
60. Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
61. Id. at 1203-04.
62. Id. at 1206.
63. Id.
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In the final decision in the Homans saga,' a Tenth Circuit panel
affirmed the district court, but split over whether Buckley was an
insurmountable barrier to all spending limits, and whether timeprotection and electoral competition are compelling justifications
for such limits. Writing the "principal opinion ' 65 for the panel,
Judge Lucero determined that Buckley was not a per se prohibition
on spending limits. 6 6 Rather, he concluded, Buckley resolved only
the sufficiency of the arguments specifically addressed by the Supreme Court-anti-corruption, equalization of candidate resources, and limiting campaign costs-"leav[ing] open the
possibility that at least in some circumstances expenditure limits
may withstand constitutional scrutiny. ' 67 He determined that
time-protection was conceptually distinct from the cost-limitation
argument rejected in Buckley and could be a compelling interest
justifying spending limits. 68 Similarly, the state interest in promoting electoral competition was an "interest distinct from" the candi69
date resources equalization argument rejected in Buckley.
Indeed, Judge Lucero determined that Buckley's rejection of the
anti-corruption and perception of corruption justifications for
spending limits turned on the particular circumstances of that
case.7 0 Thus, it would be possible for a government to produce evidence that expenditure limits are necessary to prevent corruption.
Ultimately, however, Judge Lucero, applying the strict scrutiny
analysis he agreed Buckley requires for judicial review of campaign
expenditure limitations, held that Albuquerque could not demonstrate that spending limits were necessary to meet the compelling
government interests asserted.7 1 The city had failed to present evidence that bundling practices in Albuquerque actually circumvented contribution restrictions, that there was undue special
interest influence on government, or that spending limits actually

64. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 625 (2004) [hereinafter Homans III].
65. Id. at 902; see id. at 914 n.1 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). In the concurring
opinion, joined by Judge O'Brien, Judge Tymkovich refers to the opinion of Judge
Lucero as the "principal opinion" even though two of the three members of the panel
did not join its interpretation of Buckley. Id.
66. Id. at 902.
67. Id. at 906, 906 n.7.
68. Id. at 911-13.
69. Id. at 913.
70. See id. at 907-08.
71. Id. at 913.
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promoted public confidence in government.12 The city had also
failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the time
burden of fundraising was a "problem of constitutional proportions" in Albuquerque7 3 or that spending limits actually improved
electoral competition.74
In his concurring opinion, Judge Tymkovich, joined by Judge
O'Brien, agreed with Judge Lucero that Buckley "did not adopt a
per se rule against campaign spending limits," 7 5 thereby making the

Tenth Circuit the first appellate court since Buckley was decided to
hold that campaign spending limits could be constitutional. But
Judge Tymkovich emphatically rejected the arguments for spending
limits considered by Judge Lucero. Instead, his concurrence found
that Buckley flatly precluded any justification of spending restrictions in terms of the government interest in reducing corruption.
In accord with the Sixth Circuit in Kruse, the concurrence further
found the candidate time-protection argument to be subsumed in
Buckley's rejection of a government interest in controlling election
costs. 7 6 Moreover, in an analysis foreshadowing the remand order

in Landell, the concurrence suggested that, even if time-protection
could be considered a distinct governmental interest, spending limits are not narrowly tailored to further that interest since the provision of public funding for candidates-or the imposition of higher
contribution restrictions-would reduce the time necessary for fundraising with less burden on First Amendment rights.77 Finally, the
concurrence again disagreed with the principal opinion, finding
that Buckley's rejection of equalization of candidate resources as a

72. Id. at 908-11. Judge Lucero specifically rejected the evidence that Albuquerque's spending limits had increased turnout. Id. at 909-10. Albuquerque's higher voting rate, compared with those of other cities, was apparently due to differences in the
denominator: the Albuquerque figures were based on registered voters while the
turnout rate for other cities was based on voting age population. Albuquerque turnout based on voting age population was comparable to that in other cities. Id. at 910.
Similarly, the court discounted the significance of public opinion surveys that found
Albuquerque residents had more confidence in the integrity of spending-limited local
elections compared with un-limited federal elections. The difference was ascribed to
the generally higher level of trust voters have in local government, regardless of
spending limits. Id.
73. Id. at 912.
74. Id. at 913.
75. Id. at 915 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 917-18; accord Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 916-17 (6th Cir.
1998).
77. Homans III, 366 F.3d at 919 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
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compelling argument took care of the asserted interest in electoral
competition.7 8
Together, the Cincinnati and Albuquerque cases indicate some
discontent in the lower federal courts with the foundations of
Buckley. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Buckley does not adopt
a per se rule against spending limits, and judges on the Sixth Circuit and Tenth Circuit panels found that such concerns as protecting officeholder time, promoting electoral competition, vindicating
popular faith in democracy, and even preventing corruption may
be compelling interests that justify spending limits. In addition, the
New Mexico federal district court found that, at the very least,
spending limits are consistent with effective challenges to incumbents, high voter turnout, and effective campaigning. Of course, in
both cases, the appellate courts invalidated the spending limitations. But Kruse and Homans may be said to have set the stage for
the Second Circuit's determination in Landell that candidate
spending limits can be constitutional.
C.

Landell v. Sorrell

The Vermont Campaign Finance Act of 1997 ("Act") consists of
an extensive package of campaign finance regulations, including
restrictions on contributions to candidates for state office, partial
public funding for candidates for governor, and mandatory expenditure restrictions on all candidates for state office. 79 In the inevitable constitutional challenge that followed enactment, the federal
district court found the Act was the end-product of a process that
included extensive legislative deliberation which resulted in legislative findings that rising spending levels denied some Vermonters
the opportunity to run for office, required candidates to devote
"inordinate amounts of time raising campaign funds," and reduced
"public involvement and confidence in the electoral process. "80
After a ten-day bench trial, the district court agreed with the state
that the evidence "overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Vermont
public is suspicious about the effect of big-money influence over
politics""' and that unlimited campaign spending erodes public
confidence in government and results in both actual and perceived
influence by large contributors on legislators.82 The court further
78. Id. at 919-20.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (2004).
80. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Vt. 2000).
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 469-70.

79.
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found that "the need to solicit money from large donors at times
turns legislators away from their official duties"8 3 The court determined that the specific limits adopted by Vermont would not interfere with effective campaigning. 84 In addition, relying in part on
the reasoning in the separate opinion of Judge Cohn in Kruse, the
court found that spending limits are an "effective response to certain compelling governmental interests not addressed in Buckley,"
including protecting officeholders' abilities to attend to their official duties, preserving faith in democracy, and protecting access to
the political arena." The court found "the state proved that each
of these concerns exist, and that Vermont's expenditures limits address them."86 The district court ultimately concluded, however,
that Buckley v. Valeo required that the spending limits be declared
87
unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Second Circuit determined it was not so constrained by Buckley. In both an initial opinion which was issued in
August 200288 and withdrawn just two months later 89 while a peti-

tion for rehearing en banc was pending, and the amended opinion
finally issued in August 2004,90 the Second Circuit panel determined that Buckley "did not rule campaign expenditure limits to be
83. Id. at 468.
84. Id. at 472. Under the Act, candidates for state representative or local offices
may not accept more than $200 from any single source; state senate or county office
candidates are limited to single contributions of $300 each; governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, auditor of accounts, or attorney general candidates may not accept single contributions over $400; and political committees are
limited to single source contributions of $2000 or less. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2805.
Campaign expenditures are also limited. For example, candidates for governor cannot spend more than $300,000 in any two-year general election cycle, and lieutenant
governor candidate expenditures are limited to $100,000. Id. at § 2805(a). In finding
that these limits did not hinder effective campaigning in Vermont, the District Court
noted that "[i]n Vermont legislative races, low-cost [campaigning] methods ... are
standard and even expected by the voters" and that "Vermont ranks 49th out of the
50 states in campaign spending." Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
85. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83 (citing Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d
907, 920 (6th Cir. 1998) (Cohn, J., concurring); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
86. Id. at 483.
87. Id.
88. Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002), withdrawn, Landell v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159(L), 2002 WL 31268493, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 3,
2002).
89. Landell, 2002 WL 31268493, at *1.
90. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2004). The initial Second Circuit opinion in Landell was assessed in Nathan Huff, Note, Landell v. Sorrell: Lessons
Learnedfrom Vermont's Pending Challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, 53 CATH. U. L. REV.
239 (2003). See also John T. Cooke, Making the Case for Campaign Finance: One
Theory Explainingthe Withdrawal of Landell v. Sorrell, 27 VT. L. REV. 685, 685, 691-
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per se unconstitutional, but left the door ajar for narrowly tailored
spending limits that secure clearly identified and appropriately
documented compelling governmental interests."9 1 Like Judge
Lucero in Homans, the court found that both the "corruptive influence" of unlimited spending and "the effect the perpetual fundraising has on the time of candidates and elected officials" were
9
compelling interests that could justify expenditure limitations.2
Unlike the Tenth Circuit, however, the Landell panel, in an opinion
by Judge Straub joined by Judge Pooler, found that unlimited
spending posed dangers of corruption and the appearance of corruption that were not adequately addressed by contribution
limits. 93
Acknowledging that Buckley had concluded that the corruption
danger could be effectively met by contribution limits, so that the
burden on speech resulting from spending limits was not strictly
necessary for preventing corruption, Landell found "the reality of
campaign financing in Vermont" demonstrated that contribution
limits alone were inadequate to deal with the danger that state officials would be too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.94 In particular, the court noted that due to the practice of
"bundling" small contributions together, interest groups could
make their influence felt despite the limits on individual donations.95 With unlimited spending, the resulting "arms race mentality has made candidates beholden to financial constituencies that
contribute to them." 96 Due to Buckley's holding concerning the
insufficiency of the anti-corruption justification, the Second Circuit
panel also relied on a second basis for spending limits-protecting
the time of candidates and officeholders from the burdens of fundraising. The court determined that this was a matter of compelling government concern, which Buckley had not considered in its
analysis of expenditure limitations.9 7 The court found that the
state of Vermont had proven that "the pressure to raise large sums
of money" forces candidates to devote extra time to contributors,
thus, "drastically reduc[ing] opportunities that candidates have to
94 (2003) (noting that the original decision directly challenged Buckley v. Valeo and
discussing the majority and dissenting opinions).
91. Landell, 382 F.3d at 97.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 108, 115-19.
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. Id. at 118.
96. Id. at 119.
97. Id. at 120-21, 124.
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meet with non-contributing citizens. ' 98 Drawing the anti-corruption and time protection arguments together into a general concern
for the "integrity of the electoral process," 99 the court concluded
that the "basic democratic requirements" of officeholder "accessibility" and "accountability" to constituents are "imperiled when
the time of public officials is dominated by those who pay for such
access with campaign contributions."' 100
Landell's reliance on the anti-corruption justification is certainly
in tension with Buckley's determination that spending limits are
not necessary to prevent corruption because contribution limits can
vindicate anti-corruption values while placing less of a burden on
campaign speech. As Landell found, however, as long as there is
no limit on the potential costs of a campaign, candidates (other
than those who are personally wealthy) will still need to collect
massive amounts of contributions. 01 Although individual contributions are limited, intermediary organizations can effectively "bundle" together the donations of individuals or associations with
shared economic or ideological interests so that these groups continue to play a key role in financing campaigns. Indeed, the combined effect of limited contributions and unlimited spending is a
powerful stimulus to the activities of such campaign intermediaries,
as their work benefits both donors and candidates alike. 10 2 As a
result, even with low contribution limits, people affiliated with a
particular group, interest, or sector can together make large contrithe candidate aware of, and likely
butions to a candidate, with
0 3
grateful for, their efforts.'
Landell's time-protection argument was not directly addressed
by the Supreme Court in its analysis of spending limits so the Second Circuit's analysis on this point is less of a direct challenge to
Buckley than its analysis of the anti-corruption justification. 0 As
with the court's reliance on the danger of corruption, the argument
is based on the structural tension that arises when contribution limitations are limited but expenditures are not. To raise the large and
98. Id. at 122.
99. Id. at 124 n.18 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 125.
101. Id. at 121-22.
102. Id. at 118-19.
103. Id.
104. For the intellectual foundation of the time-protection argument, see generally
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1281 (1994).
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growing sums needed to finance campaigns when contributions per
donor are limited, candidates must devote ever-increasing time and
effort to pursuing potential contributors. With time a scarce resource, these fundraising efforts necessarily cut into the time available for candidates to meet with ordinary voters and for
officeholders to attend to "information gathering, political and policy analysis, debating and compromising with fellow representatives, and the public dissemination of views." 105 As already noted,
this argument was also raised by one member of the Sixth Circuit
panel in Kruse10 6 and by a member of the Tenth Circuit panel in
0 7
Homans.1
Moreover, Buckley relied upon the public interest in
reducing the time burdens of fundraising when it upheld the op10 8
tional public funding of presidential candidates.
In considering whether the spending limits were narrowly tailored to promote the state's compelling goals, the Landell majority
found the Vermont limits advance the state's anti-corruption and
time protection goals, and that the specific spending caps adopted
are high enough to permit "effective advocacy." 09 But the Second
Circuit determined that the district court had not considered
whether spending limits are the "least restrictive means" for attaining these goals. 110 Specifically, the panel noted that the district
court had not considered whether a program of voluntary spending
limits, coupled with incentives to accept such limits-such as higher
contribution limits or the provision of public funding to participating candidates-would be "as effective in advancing the asserted
interests" justifying spending limits."' The Second Circuit remanded to the district court the question of whether these alternative means would be as effective in vindicating the state's goals
while imposing less of a burden on First Amendment rights.112
105. Id. at 1282-83.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (discussing Judge Cohn's treatment
of the time-protection argument).
107. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Lucero's finding
that the time-protection argument was conceptually different from the cost-limitation
argument rejected in Buckley). Justice Kennedy also raised this concern in Shrink
Missouri. 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
108. 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976).
109. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 125-31 (2d Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 97, 131.
111. Id. at 133.
112. Id. at 135-36, 136 n.25. The court also asked the district court on remand to
reexamine whether the specific spending limits in the law were constitutionally sound
in light of certain arguments raised by Judge Winter's dissent. The district court had
found, and the panel had agreed, that the statutory spending limits were consistent
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Judge Winter dissented.' 13 Although much of his dissent focused
on the specific terms of the Vermont limits-including the application of a single limit to both primary and general elections in the
same election cycle, the Act's broad definition of expenditure, and
the low level of the limits"n-he also determined that the majority's justifications for spending limits were precluded by Buckley." 5
Moreover, he criticized the majority's decision to remand the
"least restrictive means" question to the district court, finding it
"self-evident" that "a combination of public and private financing
with low contribution limits is infinitely less restrictive-is actually
all the ostensible purposes"
speech supportive-and accomplishes
116
limits.
spending
of the Vermont
In February 2005, the full Second Circuit rejected a petition to
rehear Landell en banc." 7 Subsequently, five members of the
court dissented from the denial of the rehearing en banc, with four
of the dissenters emphatically rejecting the panel opinion and
strongly asserting that Buckley precluded any finding that Vermont's spending limits could be constitutional." 8 The dissenters
with actual levels of campaign spending in Vermont and thus would not impede effective advocacy. Judge Winter, however, argued that data on past spending levels did
not take into account the costs of compliance with the new law, nor did they consider
"related expenditures" on behalf of a candidate by individuals or organizations other
than the candidate, which the Vermont law treats as both contributions by the entity
making the expenditure and expenditures of the candidate benefited. See id. at 16668. The majority asked the district court to take these factors into account in its reconsideration of the spending limits. Id. at 134 n.23.
113. Id. at 149 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter's dissent was endorsed by four
of the dissenters from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in the most
laudatory terms. Chief Judge Walker described Judge Winter's dissent as "impassioned, insightful, and carefully reasoned," Landel v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159(L), 2005
WL 826151, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2005), amended Apr. 11, 2005, Apr. 20, 2005, and
May 11, 2005; Judge Jacobs praised the Winter opinion as "scintillating ... learned
and witty," id. at *9; Judge Cabranes agreed that the Winter dissent was "comprehensive and fully persuasive ... a tour de force." Id. at *13. Judge Wesley joined all three
dissents without writing one of his own. Even four of the judges who concurred in the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc agreed that Judge Winter's opinion was
"thorough and forceful." Id. at *1 (Sack, J., and Katzmann, J., concurring).
114. Landell, 382 F.3d at 150-83. Four of the dissenters from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc also specifically adverted to the very low level of the spending limit imposed by the Vermont law. See Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *8 ("These
limits are drastically below realistic spending levels for competitive races.") (Walker,
C.J., dissenting); id. at *14 ("The particular expenditure limits imposed by Act 64 are
so laughably low .... ") (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
115. 382 F.3d at 184.
116. Id. at 207.
117. Landell, 2005 WL 826151.
118. Chief Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, Raggi, and Wesley dissented. Judge Raggi's brief dissent declined "to express an opinion on the merits,"
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reiterated the traditional view that Buckley bars the use of anticorruption arguments to sustain spending limits, 119 rejected out of
hand the argument that officeholder time protection could be a
compelling government interest, 2 ' and, in impassioned terms, denounced the very idea of expenditure limitations.'2 1
Seven members of the Second Circuit joined in opinions concurring in the denial of the rehearing en banc. This group included
Judges Straub and Pooler, who had been on the Landell panel, and
Judges Sack, Katzmann, Sotomayor, and B.D. Parker, who joined
in an opinion written by Judges Sack and Katzmann that emphasized that the denial of rehearing en banc was based on the Second

Circuit's longstanding tradition of rejecting en banc review and was
not a consideration of the merits. 22 Only Judge Calabresi's separate concurrence addressed the First Amendment issues presented
by Vermont's expenditure limitation. More radically than the panel
majority, Judge Calabresi directly challenged Buckley's framing of
the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation solely in terms
of the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption.
Instead, he made inequality the centerpiece of his analysis. As he
put it, the impact of wealth inequalities on elections is "the huge
elephant-and donkey-in the living room in all discussions of
campaign finance reform."'12 3 Indeed, he suggested, "it is not entirely out of the question" that equality as well as anti-corruption
and time-protection concerns were behind Vermont's decision to
and simply concluded that "this case presents serious questions that warrant further
consideration by the whole court." Id. at *14. Chief Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs,
Cabranes, and Wesley disagreed with the panel's resolution of the merits. Chief
Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs and Cabranes each wrote an opinion which was
joined by the other judges who dissented on the merits.
119. See id. at *5 (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at *6 (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at *2 (panel opinion sets a "dangerous precedent") (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *13 ("The Act at issue in this case is as unconstitutional as if Vermont
were to create a dukedom, apply a thumbscrew, or tax Wisconsin cheese.") (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting); id. at *14 (stating they were "bald-faced political protectionism")
(Cabranes, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at *1 (Sack, J., and Katzmann, J., concurring); see also id. (citing Jon 0.
Newman, In Bane Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint,50 BROOK.
L. REV. 365, 371 (1984) (noting that the Second Circuit voted to hear only six cases en
banc, while denying petitions for rehearing in nineteen cases between 1979 and
1983)). These four concurring judges avoided any comment on the First Amendment
merits of the case, except to say "we doubt it," id. at "1,n.3, in response to the contention of Judge Jacobs that the Landell panel's decision was attributable to the "many
constitutional-law professors and news media [that] lend their prestige and voice to
such measures." Id. at *12.
123. Id. at *1.
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adopt candidate spending limits. 124 "[T]he sort of conversation
taking place in Vermont (and elsewhere) would be a far more fruitful one-from the standpoints both of campaign finance policy and
constitutional jurisprudence-were it able to be brought out from
under Buckley's corruption mantle and into a framework that more
honestly reflects the issues at play. ' 125 Judge Calabresi concluded
that the Supreme Court's reconsideration of Buckley to permit
consideration of equality arguments is "essential" to a "free and
open discussion" of campaign finance regulation, and that the best
en banc
way to speed that reconsideration was to deny rehearing
126
review.
Court
Supreme
to
closer
Landell
and move
The sharpness of the division within the Second Circuit, both
within the Landell panel and over the decision whether to hear the
case en banc, coming shortly after the Tenth Circuit's Homans decision that Buckley is not an absolute bar to spending limits, clearly
demonstrates the increasingly intense conflict within the lower
courts concerning the meaning of Buckley and the future of campaign finance jurisprudence.
D.

Landell and the Supreme Court's Evolving Campaign
Finance Jurisprudence

Landell is a sharp break from Buckley's rejection of candidate
spending limits, but it is in some respects foreshadowed by other
developments in the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, particularly the Court's recent decision in McConnell v.
FEC1 27 Indeed, the Second Circuit panel repeatedly invoked McConnell in its Landell decision.1 28 Landell's reliance on McConnell
124. Id. at *1. Judge Calabresi saw campaign spending limitations as implicitly raising two types of inequality concerns. "The first is the generalized egalitarian desire
not to advantage one group in society over another." Id. In the campaign finance
setting, that means "the deeply felt desire not to have the wealthy be able to influence
elections more than the poor." Id. Second, he suggested that unlimited campaign
spending privileges the ability of the wealthy, relative to the poor, to "express the
intensity of their political feelings .... In other words, and crucially, a large contribution by a person of great means may influence an election enormously, and yet may
represent a far less intensity of desire than a pittance given by a poor person." Id.
Judge Calabresi indicated that this differential wealth-bounded ability to express intensities of political feelings is a First Amendment concern-"the First Amendment
right to have one's intensity of desire, as expressed in monetary terms, be measured
equally." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.

127. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
128. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 97 nn.1-2, 108, 108 n.6, 11-15, 116 n.il,
117 n.12, 118 n.13, 124, 124 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004). Judge Calabresi's concurrence in the
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is, in some sense, curious since McConnell upheld the "soft money"
restrictions of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 ("BCRA"), and "soft money" consists of contributionsto parties, rather than expenditures by candidates. 129 Indeed, McConnell
restated Buckley's contribution/expenditure distinction, 130 and relied on it in justifying the application of the lower standard of review used for contribution limits to BCRA's soft money
restrictions. 3 Yet, the Second Circuit's use of McConnell does accurately capture the Supreme Court's increasingly deferential approach to campaign finance regulation, McConnell's recognition
that campaign finance restrictions advance as well as burden constitutional values, and the relevance of the justifications for soft
money regulation to spending limitation. In addition to McConnell, although the Supreme Court has never directly challenged
Buckley's treatment of spending limitations, other decisions by the
Court are in tension with Buckley's holding.
First, the Supreme Court has actually upheld expenditure limits.
In McConnell, the Court upheld bans on both corporate and labor
union election spending. 132 Prior to McConnell, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce 33 sustained a state law banning corporate
election expenditures, finding the prohibition justified by a compelling interest in controlling "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth" which could "unfairly influence
elections when ... deployed in the form of independent expenditures.' 34 Austin suggests a concern about the inequality of politidenial of rehearing en banc also saw in McConnell a "broader understanding of the
'corruption' rationale than what Buckley enunciated-an understanding that could
perhaps be read as gesturing toward some of the 'equality' considerations that Buckley purportedly purged from the debate." See Landell, 2005 WL 826151 at *1 n.6.
129. See 540 U.S. at 224. According to Federal Election Commission member
Bradley A. Smith "[a]ny money that is not contributed directly to a candidate's campaign or used expressly to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate constitutes a
form of soft money, although the term is used most often when discussing such donations made to political parties." BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 185 (2001).
130. 540 U.S. at 120-21.
131. Id. at 134-37. The dissenters from the denial of the rehearing en banc in Landell emphasized McConnell's limitation to contribution restrictions, and its implicit
preservation of the contribution/expenditure distinction. See Landell, 2005 WL
826151 at *3 (Walker, C.J., dissenting).
132. 540 U.S. at 201-02. McConnell is the first decision in the post-Buckley era that
expressly treats the prohibition on both corporations and unions against using their
treasury funds in election campaigns as constitutional.
133. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
134. Id. at 660.
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cal influence, notwithstanding Buckley's rejection of inequality as a
justification for spending limits.
To be sure, Austin found that corporate spending poses a unique
danger of corruption because corporations enjoy a "unique stateconferred corporate structure" that enables them to accumulate
large sums of money.135 A corporation's financial resources reflect
the success of the corporation's commercial activities and not the
extent of support for its political ideas. Limits on corporations
have, thus, been held to be justified "to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization ...[are] not..

.

converted

36

Yet, Austin's attempt to limit its coninto political 'war' chests."'
cern with large campaign war chests to corporations is unpersuasive. It is hard to see why a corporation's state-granted advantages
make its speech any more corrupting than the speech of wealthy
individuals or noncorporate groups. Moreover, as Justice Scalia
pointed out in his Austin dissent, corporations are not alone in receiving special advantages from the state.1 37 Other business associations-as well as billionaire individuals who benefit from
inheritance laws or obtain their wealth from investments in corporations-may build up campaign war chests "that have little or no
correlation to the public's support"13 8 for their political ideas.'3 9
Nor is it clear how Austin's reasons for limiting corporate spending
justify the limits on union spending upheld in McConnell. Although the Court has doctrinally bracketed corporations and unions as special cases, the only justification for the corporate and
union spending limits that the Court has articulated sounds a lot
more like the equality rationale rejected in Buckley than the corruption concern that has been the only formally recognized basis
for limiting campaign finance activities.
Second, the Court in McConnell significantly reframed the way it
addresses the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation.
Tracking the formulation articulated by Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,14 ° McConnell treated campaign finance laws not simply
as burdens on speech and association, but as positive "measures
135. Id.
136. FEC v. Nat. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (citations
omitted).
137. 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 660.
139. See id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. See 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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aimed at promoting the integrity of the [political] process."' 14 1 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Shrink Missouri suggested that
campaign finance law involves not one set of constitutional principles-freedom of speech and association-but the reconciliation of
''competing constitutional interests," including the promotion of
democracy. 142 Moreover, McConnell followed the Shrink Missouri
Breyer concurrence in giving a striking degree of judicial deference
to legislative judgments on campaign finance regulation. McConnell repeatedly recognized Congress's "particular expertise '143 concerning the impact of specific campaign finance practices and their
effects on both elections and government decision-making. 144 Indeed, the Court deferred to Congress not just with respect to political facts and electoral predictions, but also concerning the weight
to be given to those facts and predictions in balancing democracypromoting regulation against the speech and associational rights of
145
parties and interest groups.
Finally, both Justice Kennedy's dissent and Justice Breyer's concurrence in Shrink Missouri, as well as the opinion for the Court1' in
46
McConnell, focused attention on the "post-Buckley experience'
in considering the constitutional questions posed by campaign finance regulation. Justice Kennedy lamented that "Buckley has not
worked,

147

explaining that "by accepting half of what Congress

did (limiting contributions) but rejecting the other (limiting expenditures)" 14 Buckley "created a misshapen system" marked by
massive avoidance of contribution limits. 149 Although Justice Kennedy indicated he preferred to invalidate both contribution and
expenditure limits, he was willing to "leave open the possibility
that Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which
there are some limits on both expenditures and contributions."' 150
He specifically noted that a benefit of such a system is that it
would "permit[ ] officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts
on official duties rather than on fundraising. "151 Justice Breyer
141. 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003).
142. 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143. 540 U.S. at 137.
144. See id. at 153, 156, 157, 165, 167, 185, 207.
145. Id. at 137.
146. 528 U.S. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing id. at 406-09 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
147. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 407.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 409.
151. Id.
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suggested that a review of the post-Buckley experience might lead
the Court to "mak[e] less absolute the contribution/expenditure
line, particularly in respect to independently wealthy candidates. ' 152 Without directly challenging the contribution/expenditure line, McConnell relied heavily on the post-Buckley experience
in concluding that the distinction Buckley had drawn between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy" was "functionally meaningless," thereby upholding BCRA's restrictions and requirements
with respect to electioneering communication. 153 So, too, the McConnell Court agreed that the extensive post-Buckley efforts by
candidates, contributors, and interest groups alike to avoid Buckley's limits justified BCRA's aggressive anti-circumvention
provisions. 5 4

Thus, although McConnell does not directly challenge Buckley's
approach to expenditure limitations and, indeed, relies on it in validating BCRA's limits on soft money contributions, McConnell's
concern for democratic values, its deference to Congressional factfinding, and its willingness to reconsider aspects of the campaign
finance doctrine articulated in Buckley in light of the post-Buckley
experience all indicate that the Landell majority's repeated invocation of McConnell is entirely appropriate. McConnell, the separate
opinions in Shrink Missouri, and the Court's partial reliance on inequality concerns in Austin, together suggest that, while Landell
surely represents a sharp break from Buckley, it is not entirely out
of step with the Supreme Court's evolving campaign finance
jurisprudence.
I.

THE LANDELL REMAND:

Is PUBLIC FUNDING A LESS

RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO SPENDING LIMITS?

In ordering a remand, the Landell panel raised the surprising
possibility that two longstanding and traditionally complementary
tenets of campaign finance reform-public funding and spending
limits-may, ironically, be in conflict with each other. Although
the Second Circuit found that both the prevention of corruption
and the appearance of corruption and the protection of candidate
time from the burdens of fundraising are compelling constitutional
concerns that could justify candidate spending limits, the court
asked the district court to consider on remand whether there are
152. Id. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
153. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003).
154. Id. at 185.
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1 55
less constitutionally burdensome means of achieving those goals.
Specifically, the appeals court directed the district court to assess
whether the possibility that the Vermont legislature could adopt a
program of voluntary public funding, with spending limits accepted
by candidates as a condition for receiving public funds, is such a
less restrictive means. 56 If so, then spending limits would be
unconstitutional.
Judge Winter, in his dissent, found it "self-evident" that public
funding would be a less restrictive way of "freeing candidates of
improper influence from particular donors and relieving candidates
of the need for extensive fundraising. '"157 He concluded that a remand was unnecessary to address the less restrictive means question since public funding was certainly a less constitutionally
burdensome way of achieving the state's goals than mandatory

158
spending limits.

Judge Winter is correct in noting that public funding can reduce
both the time burdens of fundraising and the ability of private interest groups to reap the quid pro quo benefits of providing candidates with financial support since public funding by definition
provides candidates with an alternative to private fundraising. But,
although public funding is an alternative to spending limits, it
should not be treated as a less restrictive means than spending limits of promoting these goals.
First, all existing public funding systems include spending limits.
Thus, they burden campaign speech as much as spending limits
without public funding. To be sure, the Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of these limits on the theory that they are voluntarily agreed to by the candidate who has chosen to accept public funding. 159 But that assumes candidates have the right to
decline public funding (and the concomitant limits). If that is the
case, then optional public funding, even with limits, will not be an
effective way of achieving the anti-corruption and time-protection
interests approved by the Landell court.
Of course, a public funding system without spending limits is theoretically possible. In such a program of floors without ceilings,
155. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 148 (2d Cir. 2004).
156. Id. at 131-33.
157. Id. at 207 (Winter, J., dissenting); see also Homans IIl, 366 F.3d 900, 914 (10th
Cir. 2004) (mentioning public funding as an alternative version of campaign finance
reform).
158. Landell, 382 F.3d at 207.
159. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (treating a candidate acceptance of spending limits as a condition for public funding as voluntary).
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candidates could be given a basic amount of public funds to assure
all candidates the ability to compete at some appropriate level, but
then candidates would be free to raise whatever they can and to
spend whatever they can raise. This would not burden speech, but
candidates would remain free to amass and use unlimited private
donations. Such a system would be largely ineffective in attaining
the anti-corruption and time-protection goals relied on by the Landell court.
Second, even assuming a voluntarily-accepted spending limit as a
condition for public funding is somehow both less of a burden on
speech and equally effective in achieving the anti-corruption and
time-protection goals, it should not be treated as a less restrictive
alternative in the constitutional sense. A program should be considered a less restrictive alternative to an enacted program only if it
is similar in kind to the enacted program and comparably available
politically. 160 Thus, a higher spending limit would be a less restrictive alternative to a lower spending limit, although it might be less
effective at reaching the spending limit's goals. So, too, a higher
contribution limit would be a less restrictive and potentially effective alternative for attaining the time-protection goals of a spending limit, although it could undermine the anti-corruption goal.
Both a higher contribution limit and a higher spending limit are
similar in kind to a lower spending limit, as they both involve restrictions on the raising and spending of private campaign funds.
These alternatives are both presumably politically available to the
legislature that adopted a lower spending limit.
Public funding, however, is a totally different type of government intervention into the financing of a political campaign. By
providing candidates with taxpayer dollars, rather than by limiting
private funds, public funding changes the structure of the campaign finance system. It is, thus, a significant departure from both
traditional forms of campaign finance and traditional forms of campaign finance regulation. Moreover, as Federal Election Commission Chairman Bradley Smith has noted, there is an "almost
endless array" of public funding systems. 161 Adopting a public
funding system involves complex choices concerning which candidates are to get funds, how much funding any candidate is to get,
what is the basis for deciding how much a candidate gets, and what
160. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1318 (noting that an optional system might increase time spent fundraising).
161. SMITH, supra note 129, at 89.
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conditions apply to publicly funded candidates. 62 Some public
funding systems, like that used in the presidential general election,
provide qualifying candidates with a flat grant. 163 Others match
some fraction of private contributions, although at varying ratios of
public dollars to private dollars. 164 In short, public funding
presents many complex questions that are totally different from
those raised by contribution and spending limits.
Not only is public funding categorically distinct from contribution and expenditure limitations, but public funding is also quite
controversial. Although, as I have argued elsewhere, public funding would be an extremely positive campaign finance reform,1 65
public funding has drawn considerable political and ideological opposition. Whereas most jurisdictions impose some limitations on
contributions, only a relatively small number provide public funding. 166 Public funding is often derided as "welfare for politicians."
Certainly, as Chairman Smith has noted, "[t]here are many who
have a blanket objection to any government financing of cam67
paigns as inherently beyond the scope of... good government."1
Indeed, in Congress the Republican Party has opposed public
funding as "an issue of principle' 1 68 as well as on political grounds.
It is doubtful that a measure that is both so different from spending
and has drawn such consistent political and philosophical opposition should be considered an available alternative to spending
limits.
Third, public funding may not be as effective at advancing the
anti-corruption and time-protection goals cited by the Second Circuit unless mandatory spending caps are imposed even on candidates who do not accept public funds. As long as candidates are
free to opt out of public funding (and the spending limits that are a
part of all public funding programs), some candidates will do so.
There will be candidates who will want to spend well above the
public funding limit and who believe they will be able to raise the
162. See id. at 88-105.
163. Id. at 96. "Matching" funds of up to $250 per contribution are provided to all
candidates seeking his or her party nomination who raises at least $5000 in each of
twenty states in amounts of $250 or less. Id.
164. Id. at 97.
165. See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 563 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Public Funding] .
166. See id. at 566-67 (noting that public funding is used in presidential elections as
well as in statewide elections in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and in local elections in
New York City and Los Angeles).
167. SMITH, supra note 129, at 89.
168. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1318.
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funds that will enable them to do so. These will often be candidates who are either backed by extensive fundraising networks, or
are personally wealthy. George W. Bush, who opted out of the
presidential pre-nomination public funding limits in 2000 and 2004,
exemplifies the first category, as does John Kerry, who also opted
out of the presidential primary public funding system in 2004.169
Michael Bloomberg, who drew on his enormous personal wealth to
opt out of New York City's mayoral
public funding system in 2001,
170
exemplifies the second category.
Not only do the candidates in the first category create corruption, appearance of corruption, and time-burden problems for
themselves, but both types of opt-out candidates re-create the corruption, appearance of corruption, and time burden problems for
their opponents and the electoral system as a whole. So long as
some candidates are able to spend without limit, there will be pressure on their opponents to raise and spend amounts that will match
the high-spenders. This will tend to force some candidates who
might have preferred to take public funding with spending limits to
opt for private funding without limits. This is particularly likely to
occur when the public funding level is not high enough to support
effective campaigning. Due to the political resistance to public
funding previously mentioned, even when public funding systems
are adopted, they are often underfunded and so do not provide
adequate resources to participating candidates. 171 But in any
event, due to opt-outs, so long as public funding is voluntary, it will
not be as effective in attaining the anti-corruption and time-protection goals as mandatory spending limits.
Public funding should be seen not as an alternative to spending
limits, but as a complement to it, and vice versa. Spending limits
with public funding will do a better job of reducing the potentially
corruptive effects of campaign contributions and reducing the time
burdens of fundraising than spending limits without public funding.
After all, without public funding, even candidates subject to spending limits must still spend time and effort in raising funds and they
will still be dependent on the financial support of their contributors. Personally wealthy candidates, of course, are not subject to
169. See Campaign Legal Ctr., PresidentialPublic Funding System: Problems of the
Public Funding System, at http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-53.html (last
visited May 6, 2005).
170. See PAUL RYAN, CTR. FOR Gov'T STUDIES, A STATUTE OF LIBERTY: How
NEW YORK CITY'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE OF LOCAL
ELECTIONS 2, available at http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/nycreport.pdf.

171. See Briffault, Public Funding, supra note 165, at 586, 568 n.73.
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the potentially corruptive effects of private contributions and are
not burdened by the requirements of fundraising. Most candidates,
however, are not wealthy enough to fund their own campaigns, nor
would it be desirable to solve the corruption and time-protection
problems by restricting elective office to the rich. Public funding,
as Judge Winter noted, theoretically solves the corruption and
time-burden problems while actually providing new resources for
electoral communication which can be particularly beneficial to political newcomers and challengers.' 7 2 But, in practice, the effectiveness of public funding would be greatly strengthened if all
candidates were subject to spending limits.
III.

MAKING THE CASE FOR SPENDING LIMITS

Although Landell did not uphold Vermont's spending limits, the
Second Circuit did find that spending limits could be constitutional.
The court read Buckley's invalidation of FECA's spending limits as
just a rejection of the specific justifications put forward and considered by the Supreme Court. 73 Buckley found only that "[n]o
governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to jusFirst Amendment burden created by FECA's spending
tify" the
limits; 1 74 but, Landell found, Buckley did not hold that there is no
governmental interest that could justify limits.
More controversially, the Landell court determined that, in light
of the changed campaign finance circumstances since Buckley, one
of the arguments for spending limits that was rejected by Buckley-the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption-can now provide a constitutionally sufficient justification for
limits. 175 Unlike Buckley, the Second Circuit found that, in the absence of spending limits, contribution limits have failed to stem the
corruption danger because the need for unlimited funds compels
candidates to turn to intermediaries and bundlers in their quest for
campaign money. 1 76 Despite this departure from Buckley, Landell
still hews to Buckley's basic approach of focusing on the impact of
the process of raising the funds necessary to pay for unlimited
spending on the behavior of officeholders and the consequences
for governance. Like Buckley, Landell focused on the potentially
corrupting effects of the pursuit of contributions on the integrity of
172. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
173. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 106-10 (2d Cir. 2004).
174. Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976).
175. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 115-19.
176. See id. at 118.
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officerholder decisions, and on the potential effects of the appear177
ance of such corruption on public confidence in government.
Landell added to Buckley's corruption concern consideration of
the distracting effect unlimited fundraising has on officeholder
time and governance. 78 But in looking at the impact on a campaign spending practice on governance rather than on the election
itself, Landell is still on the same wavelength as Buckley.
As I will suggest in the next two sections of this Part, although
Landell's governance concerns are important, it is uncertain
whether, by themselves, they provide a constitutionally sufficient
basis to justify spending limits. The constitutional case for spending limits becomes clearer when the impact of unlimited spending-which, of course, means unequal spending-on fundamental
features of democratic elections, particularly electoral competitiveness and voter equality are taken into account. Electoral competition, voter equality, and concerns about governance together form
an overarching interest in democratic self-government which may
provide a constitutionally compelling case for spending limits.
A.

The Prevention of Corruption and the Appearance
of Corruption

The heart of Landell's corruption justification is that Buckley
failed to anticipate how the rise of bundling-due in part to the
negative synergy of limited contributions and unlimited spendingre-introduced the potential for corruption and the appearance of
corruption inherent in large contributions back into the campaign
finance system.1 7 9 In revisiting this aspect of Buckley, Landell
drew comfort from language in McConnell in which the Court indicated it was willing to reconsider some of its earlier campaign finance judgments in light of the post-Buckley experience. 18 0
McConnell gave great weight to the rise of campaign finance practices that enable candidates and donors to effectively circumvent
FECA's limits on large contributions while abiding by the letter of
the law. The "soft money" which was the major target of BCRA
allowed donors and candidates to evade contribution restrictions
by channeling large contributions to political parties which could
177. See id. at 116-17.
178. See id. at 119-24.
179. Id. at 118 (explaining that bundling could lead to contributor dominance in
political campaigns, which could corrupt the process).
180. See id. at 118 n.13 (emphasizing that bundling can lead to the appearance of
corruption).
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not have been given directly to the candidates.' 81 McConnell not
only upheld tight restrictions on the soft money practices that had
provoked Congress into enacting BCRA, but also sustained limits
on other practices which had not yet proven problematic, but
which Congress feared might become future conduits for campaign
finance law evasion. 181 The post-Buckley experience with evasion
thus led the Court both to sustain restrictions on campaign finance
practices that did not involve the direct transmission of funds from
donors to candidates and to defer to Congress's judgment concerning what campaign practices are likely to cause the same dangers of
corruption and the appearance of corruption as direct contributions to candidates.
Landell is no doubt right that McConnell would support regulation aimed at preventing the corruption and appearance of corruption dangers posed by bundling. Landell is also no doubt correct in
finding that the absence of spending limits poses a major incentive
to bundling. But it is not clear that a spending limit is the least
constitutionally restrictive means of addressing the bundling problem. One arguably less restrictive way of dealing with the potentially corruptive consequences of bundling is direct regulation of
bundling itself. In the past, Congress considered legislation that
would treat contributions collected or arranged by an intermediary
as contributions of that intermediary, subject to contribution limits." 3 While no such rule was adopted, the anti-bundling proposals
suggest an alternative means of addressing the potentially corruptive nature of the bundled contributions that is less restrictive of
candidate speech than spending limits.
Buckley may have overstated the ability of contribution limits to
address the corruption danger by failing to consider how the interplay of contribution limits and unlimited spending provides intermediaries and bundlers with an opportunity to play a pivotal
role in campaign finance, thereby bolstering their influence on government. But it is not clear that even this more sophisticated understanding of the corruption problem, taken by itself, is sufficient
to justify spending limits given the possibility of attacking the bun181. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 145-48 (2003).
182. See id. at 178-81 (upholding BCRA § 323(d), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (2005)), 18489 (upholding BCRA § 323(f), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(f)); see also Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147,
149, 167 (2004).
183. See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE:
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 193-94 (1990); FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 207-08 (1992).
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dling problem without directly capping spending. So long as the
only constitutionally cognizable justification for limiting campaign
finance practices is the corruptive effect of donations on officeholders (and the demoralizing "appearance of corruption" on a
broader public aware of these contributions), spending limits will
always be subject to the argument than restrictions on contributions, including bundling, are a less constitutionally burdensome
means of achieving the anti-corruption goal. Indeed, even the Second Circuit appeared to recognize that the corruption and appearance of corruption concerns alone did not provide the necessary
constitutional predicate for spending limits when it turned to a second justification-officeholder and candidate time protection.
B.

Time Protection

The time-protection argument is a very appealing justification
for campaign spending limitation because it gets at some of the
most disturbing consequences of our campaign finance systemthe distraction of officeholders from the public business they are
elected to address, and the increasing tendency of the fundraising
system to discourage potential candidates from running for office. 184 Moreover, although the time-protection concern was arguably before the Buckley Court, 185 the Court did not discuss it in
the context of spending limits so it cannot be said that Buckley
ruled out this justification for spending limits. Landell also correctly concluded that the time-justification argument should not be
considered precluded by Buckley's rejection of high and rising
campaign costs as a justification for spending limits since time protection addresses a different concern. As a result, there is less of a
precedential barrier to the time-protection argument than to the
anti-corruption argument. Indeed, an important aspect of the
time-protection argument is that it begins to push the campaign
finance debate beyond the corruption/appearance of corruption
framework to consider the broader impact of our campaign finance
system on our political process. Yet the time-protection argument,
like the anti-bundling concern, is still primarily focused on the im184. See id. at 189 n.24 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1975)).
185. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 188-89 (Winter, J., dissenting) (noting that the timeprotection argument was relied on by the Court of Appeals in Buckley, was discussed
in the brief filed on behalf of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, and was
mentioned by the Supreme Court) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)).
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pact of unlimited and unequal spending on government decisionmaking, rather than on the fairness of elections themselves.
Preliminarily, like the anti-bundling argument, the time-protection justification may be open to the response that there is a less
restrictive fundraising law change that would also protect candidate and officeholder time-an increase in the contribution limits.
A key reason why candidates have to spend so much time raising
money is because they are allowed to accept only a limited amount
per donor. If donors could make larger donations, more money
could be raised with less effort and less use of candidate time. Of
course, this would exacerbate the potentially corrupting consequences of large donations, so that raising contribution limits,
while less restrictive, will also be less effective in improving the
quality of government. So, a spending limit may be the least restrictive means of advancing the time-protection goal consistent
with also pursuing the anti-corruption goals vindicated by contribu186
tion limits.
Thus, the more important question is whether reducing the timeburdens of fundraising is a compelling government purpose. The
time-protection argument combines two distinct elements-the impact of fundraising burdens on candidates, and the separate impact
on officeholders. For candidates, the argument is that fundraising
needs distort campaigning by forcing candidates to spend time with
potential donors rather than with other voters.18 7 According to this
view, spending limits-provided the limits are high enough to allow
for effective campaigning-would free candidates to spend more
time with ordinary, non-wealthy voters. This is an attractive goal,
but it is not clear that the government has a compelling interest in
determining how candidates campaign or which groups they target
with their appeals. Moreover, it is unlikely that the candidates will
actually ignore non-donor voters. Fundraising may require candidates to give greater attention to donors and potential donors than
their votes alone would warrant, but all candidates will eventually
186. Public funding would also arguably be a less restrictive means of protecting
candidate time than spending limits. Unlike spending limits, public funding actually
gives candidates funds, thus more directly protecting candidate time than simply capping the total a candidate can spend. The reasons previously given in Part II as to why
public funding may not be appropriately treated as a less restrictive alternative are
also applicable here. As with the anti-corruption concern, spending limits and public
funding could work well together to protect officeholder time; they should not be
seen as mutually exclusive.
187. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 119-24; Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83. I say "other"
voters since many-albeit not all-potential donors are likely to be voters in the candidate's jurisdiction.
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have to aim their campaigns at the voters, and not just at donors,
since, ultimately, candidates need votes in order to win. So the
candidate portion of the time-protection argument reduces to a
government interest in the relative shares of candidate time devoted to donors versus nondonor voters.
The crux of the time-protection argument, thus, must be the protection of officeholder time. The original and most effective development of the time-protection argument focused on the need to
protect officeholder time, freeing elected officials to devote more
of their energies to the policymaking activities that are at the heart
of their public responsibilities. 188 Yet, this argument, too, is vulnerable to the rebuttal that the real time diversion for officeholders is
not fundraising but the campaigning of which fundraising is just a
part. In other words, it is the electoral process itself, or, more accurately, the need to run for reelection in order to continue to hold
office that diverts an elected official's time from the substantive
responsibilities of office. It is unclear whether fundraising takes up
more of officials' time than conferring with influential local party
and civic leaders, attending the events of economic, social, ideological and media organizations, or meeting and greeting constituents
throughout their terms of office as part of the permanent reelection campaign. Yet, surely the democratic accountability provided
by the need to seek reelection is a fundamental value of our system, not a problem. 8 9 To the extent that the time devoted to
campaigning does interfere with good government, there may be
less restrictive solutions than an expenditure cap, such as limiting
campaigning while the legislature is in session or limiting the number of terms an official may serve, thus eliminating the distraction
of a reelection campaign from the final term.1 90 More troubling, to
the extent that it is difficult to distinguish the time burdens of fundraising from the time burdens of campaigning, the time-protection
argument may be seen as implicitly suggesting a skeptical view of
the value of elections themselves.

188. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83 (explaining that fundraising efforts detract from both the quantity and the quality of time a candidate can spend on "information gathering, political and policy analysis, and debating and compromising with
fellow representatives").
189. See id. at 1283 n.7 (explaining that constituents are "most actively engaged in
expressing their complaints and preferences" during elections).
190. I do not advocate either of these measures, or address the constitutional issues
raised by the first, but merely use them to indicate that there may be other effective
means of addressing the time burden problem without limiting campaign speech.
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Of course, it could be argued that seeking media, interest group,
or opinion leader endorsements, meeting with economic and social
constituencies, and frequent interchanges with the voters is a more
desirable form of campaigning than fundraising since fundraising
focuses public officials' time on large donors while other forms of
campaigning address the mass of constituents or the groups that
represent their interests. But that counterargument is really a return to the candidate time-protection argument which, as I have
suggested, seems less than compelling.
To be sure, the time-protection argument has emerged as a powerful one for scholars and judges alike. It has drawn the respectful
attention of Justice Kennedy, who has otherwise been generally
hostile to campaign finance regulation, 191 and individual members
of the Sixth and Tenth Circuit panels,192 as well as the Landell majority. 193 It accurately captures the sense that the need to raise
funds to match an opponent up to an unlimited maximum can take
an enormous amount of elected officials' time and distract them
from the business of government. Yet it is not clear whether candidate and officeholder time-protection constitutes a compelling justification for limiting candidate spending.
One aspect of the time-protection concern, however, may point
the way to a more powerful justification for spending limits. There
is considerable anecdotal evidence that the rigors of fundraising
have contributed to the decisions of some elected officials to decline to seek reelection, and, more importantly, have discouraged
some potential candidates from even participating in the electoral
process.1 94 The burdensome fundraising process, thus, can operate
to deny voters the opportunity to consider potentially attractive
candidates, while reducing the scope and intensity of electoral
competition. The costs of the current fundraising system, which is
driven by unlimited spending, thus, point to a significant justification for spending limits-the compelling governmental interest in
promoting competitive elections.

191. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 119-24.
194. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1293.
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Competitive Elections

As the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has explained, "[e]lections are about giving voters choices. '"195 A fair
election allows voters to choose among a number of contenders for
the same position, and also allows the candidates to compete for
votes. 196 It is particularly important that voters, when faced with
an incumbent seeking reelection, be able to consider challengers.
The opportunity to deny reelection to incumbents, and the possibility that in any given election the people may exercise their authority to vote out current officeholders, is the ultimate security of
popular control over government. As Joseph Schumpeter once obpolitical leaders
served, "electorates normally do not control their
197
them.
reelect
to
refusing
by
except
in any way
Incumbents typically start out in an election with many built-in
advantages ranging from the free media attention they have received while in office to the opportunity to use their offices to provide constituency service and bring pork barrel expenditures back
to their districts. These advantages contribute to, and are typically
reinforced by, an incumbent's superior fundraising prowess.1 98 Interest groups and individuals interested in having access to officeholders are more likely to give to incumbents because incumbents
are more likely to win, thus making their prediction of incumbent
reelection more likely to come true.' 99 Incumbents tend to heavily
outspend challengers, much as winners generally outspend losers
by substantial margins.2 ° Moreover, an incumbent's substantial financial superiority may discourage potential challengers from entering a race altogether.2 ° ' In effect, the incumbent's financial edge
constitutes a form of barrier to entry that reduces the competitiveness of our electoral system.
195. Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY: A
BLUEPRINT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 91 (2000) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND
DEMOCRACY].

196. See id.

197.

JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

272 (3d

ed. 1950).
198. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 91-92 (noting that "the statistical likelihood that the incumbent will be reelected increases his or her ability to collect funds from donors who want access to the winner.").
199. See id. at 92.
200. See generally id. at 65 (citing Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, Investing in the People's Business: A Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform, at 17, 67 (1999)).
201. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1293 (noting that challengers are deterred by the
"formidable war chests" incumbents can acquire by accumulating PAC contributions).
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Potentially unlimited campaign spending aggravates this burden
on competitiveness. By enabling incumbents-and personally
wealthy political newcomers-to spend all the money they can
raise, the lack of a spending limit increases the ability of an incumbent or wealthy candidate to financially outdistance opponents and
also increases the amount of money necessary to fund a competitive race. Landell's repeated references to candidates' "'pervasive
war chests'" and the "'arms race' mentality"2 °2 underscore this
point, even if the Second Circuit's focus was on the amount of time
it takes a candidate to build a war chest rather than the impact of a
large war chest and the prospect of an unending arms race in scaring off challengers and narrowing voters' options.2 °3 Unlimited
spending can reduce electoral competitiveness, particularly the
likelihood voters will hear from, and be able to choose among, candidates who are neither personally wealthy nor favored by wealthy
backers. By discouraging such candidates from running, unlimited
spending, rather than protecting speech, may actually reduce both
the amount and the diversity of electoral speech that voters hear.
To be sure, a low spending limit can be anti-competitive. Indeed,
there is evidence that being able to achieve a critical level of spending is essential for a challenger to be effective.20 4 An unreasonably
low spending limit can make it impossible for a challenger to get
her name and message out to the voters. But reasonable spending
limits would have little effect on most challengers' spending and
would primarily serve to limit the ability of incumbents to wildly
outdistance their challengers. 0 5 Reasonable spending limits could
reassure challengers that the funds they are able to raise will enable them to finance a race that is competitive with that of the
incumbent. So, too, such limits could cap the built-in advantages of
personally wealthy, self-funding candidates. With the knowledge
that they would not be dramatically outspent by incumbents or
personally wealthy candidates and that even limited fundraising
success might be enough to make them competitive, more candi202. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d, 91, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Blasi,
supra note 104, at 1287), 122 (quoting Vermont Lieutenant Governor Smith), 123
(describing the testimony of public officials about an "arms race" mentality), 127 (referring to evidence at trial and legislative hearings indicating a "widespread" arms
race mentality).
203. See, e.g., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 60, 74.
204. See generally GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
(1980).
205. See ROBERT K. GOIDEL ET AL., MONEY MATTERS: CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS 72 (1995).
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dates could be encouraged to enter races. Thus, reasonable spending limits would advance the interest in competitive elections-an
interest that is constitutionally compelling because electoral competitiveness is essential to the public accountability that elections
are intended to promote.2 °6
Nor is there a less restrictive means of addressing the anti-competitive effects of incumbent war chests and the daunting advantages of well-funded candidates than restricting the level of
spending that candidates can undertake. Public funding can enable
a less well-funded candidate to get to a basic state-determined financial floor, and so promote competitiveness. But public funding
can do nothing to limit well-funded candidates who do not take
public funding from amassing war chests that give them a huge financial advantage and may even drive their opponents from the
field.
Buckley did not directly consider the competitiveness argument
for spending limits, and neither did Landell.207 Should the case
come before the Supreme Court-or first return to the Second Circuit after a decision by the district court on remand-the ability of
spending limits to promote competitive elections ought to be considered in determining whether spending limits pass constitutional
muster.
D.

Voter Equality

The final interest worth considering in the debate over spending
limits is equality. Equality is a central premise of our democratic
system. Over the course of our history, the electorate has been
expanded to include nearly all adult citizens. The one person, one
vote doctrine 20 8 has sought to ensure not simply that each adult
citizen has a right to vote but that each voter has an equally
weighted vote, and thus an equal opportunity to affect the outcome
of the election. Moreover, our laws most emphatically deny a spe206. As with the prevention of corruption and the protection of officeholder time,
competitive elections could also be effectively promoted with public funding. As with
the other two goals, however, spending limits and public funding should be seen not
as mutually exclusive, but as mutually reinforcing.
207. Judge Lucero, writing for the Tenth Circuit panel in Homans III, noted that
the state interested in promoting electoral competition is an "interest distinct from"
the justifications considered in Buckley and might be constitutionally compelling. 366
F.3d at 913; see supra note 69.
208. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-68 (1964).
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cial place for wealth in voting or running for office."0 9 Most states
long ago scrapped wealth or tax-payment requirements for voting,
and the Supreme Court has mandated the elimination of wealthbased requirements for voting or running for office. 210 The role of
voter equality in our electoral system has implications beyond the
actual casting and counting of ballots. For an election to serve as a
mechanism of democratic decision-making there must be a considerable amount of election-related activity before balloting can occur. Candidates, parties, interest groups, and interested individuals
need to be able to attempt to persuade voters how to cast their
ballots. The election campaign is an integral part of the process of
structured choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an
election.
The interest in voter equality is not directly implicated by unlimited candidate spending. As Buckley explained, with limits on the
size of campaign contributions, differences in resources will simply
reflect differences in the size and intensity of support for candidates "and there is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy" in
that.2 11 In other words, equalizing the financial participation of
voters in the election could very well lead to differences in candidate spending if more voters give their contributions to one candidate than another. Nevertheless, the voter equality concern can
support one aspect of candidate spending limits that would not be
effectively supported by the anti-corruption and time-protection
concerns-the ability of personally wealthy candidates to use their
own funds.
In a footnote, Buckley acknowledged that its assumption that
candidate resources would reflect the size and intensity of a candidate's support-and, thus, not threaten voter equality-"may not
apply where the candidate devotes a large amount of his personal
resources to his campaign. '2 12 But wealthy, self-funded candidates
are significant players in our politics, and their large and growing
role is due in significant part to Buckley's combination of contribution limits and unlimited spending.2 1 3 These candidates are
uniquely well-positioned to spend money unconstrained by the ef209. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
210. See, e.g., Hill, 421 U.S. at 300-01 (invalidating requirement of separate approvals of voters and taxpayers as precondition for bond issue); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149
(invalidating filing fee); Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (holding poll tax unconstitutional).
211. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56 (1976).
212. Id. at 56 n.63.
213. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 73-74.
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fects of contribution limits, and their resources have nothing to do
with the amount of public support for their campaigns. Democratic equality is sorely challenged when a candidate can use her
personal wealth, which reflects neither the size nor the intensity of
her popular support, to become a major contender. Neither the
anti-corruption nor time-preservation concerns supports the imposition of limits on self-funded candidates since these candidates are
not dependent on donors and need not waste their time gathering
funds. It is not clear whether the spending of wealthy candidates
can be limited solely in order to eliminate the corruption and timeburden problems faced by their opponents. Nor is it clear if the
electoral competitiveness concern supports limits on the spending
of wealthy self-funded candidates since often, due to the interaction of contribution limits and unlimited spending, wealthy selffunded candidates are the individuals in the best position to challenge incumbents.214 Only the interest in voter equality provides a
sufficient basis for limiting spending by self-funded candidates.
In addition, only the interest in voter equality could support limits on the spending of noncandidates, such as independent committees, that may undertake expenditures in support of or opposition
to candidates. To be sure, the Vermont spending limits apply only
to candidates and related expenditures undertaken by committees,
interest groups, or individuals in support of a candidate, 215 so there
was no need in Landell to develop a spending limit justification
that extends to independent committees. Yet, ultimately, the success of candidate spending limits may turn on a state's ability to
impose reasonable limits on spending by outside groups. If spending by candidates is limited, interest groups and politically engaged
individuals may shift their campaign funds from donations to candidates to independent spending. Although independent groups
have an important role to play in presenting facts, ideas, and arguments to the voters, they do not speak for candidates, they do not
stand for election, and they are not accountable to the electorate.
The threat of unlimited one-sided spending can create the same
disincentive to candidate entry as one-sided candidate spending.
So, too, independent spending by wealthy individuals or wellfunded committees could win the gratitude of, and access to, the
elected officials who benefit from such spending, even if that
spending is not technically coordinated with the candidate. Buckley rejected this proposition, but it is uncertain whether the Court's
214. Id. at 74.
215. Vermont Campaign Finance Act of 1997, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805.

438

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXII

quasi-empirical hunch about the limited gratitude likely to result
from uncoordinated independent spending is right. More pragmatically, some jurisdictions will be reluctant to enact candidate spending limits so long as unlimited spending by wealthy individuals and
interest groups is possible. And only the interest in democratic
equality can provide a compelling justification for independent
spending limits.
Buckley emphatically and famously rejected the idea that equality can justify limitations on campaign communications.216 But in
Austin the Court engaged in reasoning that closely tracked the
voter equality argument when it upheld the prohibition on corporate campaign expenditures. As Austin explained, corporate campaign spending can "unfairly influence elections" because a
corporation's campaign funds have "little or no correlation to the
public's support for [its] ideas. ' 217 In other words, spending that
reflects the corporate spender's wealth rather than the extent of
popular support for its message gives the corporate spending an
undue influence over the electoral outcome. That is the voter
equality argument exactly. More recently, Justice Breyer, concurring with Justice Ginsburg in Shrink Missouri, pointed out that "the
as
Constitution tolerates ... limiting the political rights of some so 218
electorate.
entire
the
of
rights
political
the
effective
make
to
Thus, Buckley's rejection of equality concerns is itself in deep tension with equality concerns voiced elsewhere both by individual
members of the Court and by the Court as a whole.219
216. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
217. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
218. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
219. Although Buckley ruled out limits on independent spending, the Supreme
Court of Canada recently upheld the limits imposed by the Canada Elections Act of
2000 on independent spending by individuals and groups in Canadian elections. See
Harper v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2004] S.C.R. 827. Judge Calabresi made equality
concerns central to his concurrence in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc
in Landell. As he explained, equality is one of the "two principal values at play in the
campaign finance debate"-the other value, of course, being freedom of political expression. Landell v. Sorrell, 2005 WL 826151, at *1. Indeed, Judge Calabresi found
equality concerns embedded in the First Amendment. As he explained, Buckley's invalidation of spending limits enabled individuals to "express the intensity of their political feelings . . . through money." Id. But, due to the "unequal distribution of
wealth, money does not measure intensity of desire equally for rich and poor." Id. In
his view, the Vermont spending limits may have been intended to create "something
of an 'equal' opportunity to express intensity of political desire" and to use limits "to
make sure that that intensity is not measured differently for rich and for poor." See
id.
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As Judge Calabresi nicely put it, inequality is surely the unspoken but "huge elephant-and donkey-in the living room in all
discussions of campaign finance reform. '22 ° The amelioration of
the political consequences of wealth inequalities is surely one of
the driving forces behind campaign finance reform. That concern
should be taken directly into account in judicial consideration of
spending limits.
E.

Democratic Elections

It is not clear whether any one of the arguments presented in this
Part by itself would be sufficient to sustain candidate spending limits from constitutional challenge. The anti-corruption argument
may be of compelling importance but there are arguably less restrictive means of addressing that concern, and the significance of
elected official time-protection in a political environment in which
elections take a considerable amount of time is debatable. To the
extent that time-protection is fundamentally a concern about the
consequences of the extensive fundraising that the current regime
of limited contributions and unlimited spending requires, the ability of spending limits to alleviate the rigors of fundraising may advance the interest in electoral competition. Indeed, spending limits
directly promote electoral competitiveness by limiting the ability of
one candidate to financially overwhelm his or her opponents, but
no court has yet determined that promoting competitiveness is a
compelling concern. 221 Although protecting voter equality ought
to be a basic principle of campaign finance regulation, the relevance of voter equality to candidate spending limits, other than limits on self-funded candidates, is uncertain, and Buckley sharply
rejected the idea that equality concerns could be used to limit campaign speech. Ultimately the case for candidate spending limits
may require putting all these arguments together.
Landell suggests a framework for aggregating arguments that
might be inadequate when considered separately but powerful
when taken together. As the Second Circuit explained, the anticorruption and time-protection interests "overlap and might be
better described as one interest-'to protect the integrity of the
electoral process-the means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental ac220. Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *1.
221. But cf., Homans III, 366 F.3d at 913 (suggesting that electoral competitiveness
could be a compelling interest justifying spending limits).
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tion.' ' '222 That, indeed, should be the test. Does unlimited
spending undermine democratic elections, and are spending limits
narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest in democratic
elections?
The fundamental components of democratic elections are not
limited to the prevention of corruption and the protection of officeholder time. Rather, they include the democratic values of
electoral competition and the recognition of voter equality. To be
sure, democratic values can also be threatened by spending limits.
Limits can curtail the communications of the spenders. By limiting
such communication, they can limit the information received by
the voters. So, too, limits on candidate spending can make it
harder for candidates to engage voters in the electoral process and
mobilize them to come to the polls. In short, from a democratic
perspective, spending limits have costs as well as benefits. The assessment of spending limits in light of the elements of democratic
elections is, thus, a complex one, and certainly more complex than
the exclusive focus on the potential for corruption and the appearance of corruption taken by Buckley. But surely the rules governing campaign finance should be informed by an awareness of
the complex needs of electoral democracy.
CONCLUSION

The ultimate fate of the Vermont spending limits upheld by Landell is uncertain. The Supreme Court could agree to take the case
prior to action by the district court on remand.223 The district court
on remand, or the Second Circuit on appeal from the district
court's remand decision, could conclude that, given the possibility
of public funding for candidates, spending limits are not the least
restrictive means of advancing the compelling interests the court
found. The district court or the Second Circuit could agree with
Judge Winter that the specific spending limits adopted in 1997which do not include a cost-of-living adjustment, make no provision for the costs of compliance with the campaign spending law,
and count related expenditures of third parties not simply as contributions to candidates but as candidate expenditures, thereby eat222. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 124 n.18 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Nixon, 528
U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
223. A petition for certiorari was filed on May 12, 2005 on behalf of the Vermont
Republican State Committee, the Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc,, and other
petitioners. See Vt. Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell, No. 04-1530, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-1530.htm.
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ing into the expenditures allowed by candidates-have become too
low to permit effective advocacy and are thus unconstitutional
even if spending limits are theoretically permissible. Or, of course,
the district court and the Second Circuit could find that the limits
are constitutional. At that point the case would almost certainly go
to the Supreme Court.
Whatever the next step, Landell will have played an important
role in reopening the spending limits question. The three decades
of Buckley have created a campaign finance regime that, in its combination of limited contributions and unlimited campaign expenditures, is inherently unstable. Candidates and donors alike are
driven to create and exploit whatever loopholes they can find.
Moreover, Buckley's exclusive focus on corruption misses many of
the larger issues at stake in the financing of election campaigns.
Landell itself expands the range of judicial concern somewhat by
adding the impact of bundling and the value of time protection,
even if it failed to address such other critical factors as the implications for competitive elections and the value of voter equality. But
in challenging even a piece of Buckley, Landell may have set in
motion a process of judicial reconsideration not only of Buckley's
specific holding concerning spending limits but of Buckley's
broader framework for thinking about the constitutionality of campaign finance law.

